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VOLUME XXIX NOVEMBER, 1922 NUMBER 1
CONTRACTUAL CONTROL OVER ADJECTIVE LAW
By NATHAN IsAAcs*
Adjective law, it is generally assumed, is a matter for the
courts.' The only reference to any attempt to control questions
of practice and procedure contained in the ordinary treatises on
contract law comes under the general proposition that it is against
public policy and therefore beyond the power of contracting par-
ties to interfere with the ordinary course of justice. To this
proposition there are, of course, exceptions. But the authors gen-
erally do not feel called upon systematically to present these ex-
ceptions so as to inform the draftsman of a contract just exactly
what, if anything, can be done towards supplementing or limit-
ing the ordinary means of enforcement provided by the law in
ordinary cases.
Nevertheless business men do actually find it advisable to insert
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh, School of Law.
1 The expression "adjective law" is here used of rules of procedure and admin-
istration as distinguished from rules of substantive law, as first suggested by
Bentham. The exact sense in which these words are used differs rather widely
in the various treatises on Jurisprudence. Cf. HOLLAND, p. 76; POLLOCK, FmST
BOOK Or JURISPRUDENCE, pp. 79, 250; SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 6th ed., p. 437.
Hohfeld suggests a more accurate differentiation between primary rights and secbnd-
ary rights. The position taken in this paper is that none of these distinctions is
fundamental and that any attempt to exclude consideration of adjective law as such
from the subject matter of contracts is based on the misconception that the distinction
Is clear and fundamental.
What is said below of the treatment in the text-books on contracts does not apply.
of course, to the large encyclopedic works. PAGsE on CONTRACTS in his second
edition devotes a section of the second volume which deals with the subject matter
under the title "Concerning Procedure and Remedies" (§ 726). In this and neighbor-
ing sections a vast amount of case material is indexed, most of which upon examin-
ation is found merely to reiterate the general principles that agreements inter-
fering with the course of justice are void. As Mr. Page remarks, "We have
become so accustomed to this rule that we have never studied the possible workings
of any other." In the present study an attempt is made to sketch another rule-
that of a limited power of control by contracting parties over maters that concern
them though ordinarily not classed as substantive law.
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clauses in their contracts aimed at the creation of better modes of
enforcement than those ordinarily provided by law and at the
regulation of details coming in every stage of procedure from the
summons through the trial down to final execution. Some of these
attempts are ridiculously crude. For example, one great railroad
prints on its commutation tickets the statement that any attempt
to use the ticket after its expiration shall be conclusive evidence
of fraud on the part of the holder. There is room, however, for
innumerable more carefully devised propositions that will directly
or indirectly affect the enforcement of a contract in case of
attempted breach or the obtaining of redress in case of an actual
breach. An effort will be made here to bring together rather
than fully to discuss the various types of attempts that are con-
stantly being made in this direction. From a consideration of
them it may appear that they serve a genuine function in the bus-
iness world and that it is not quite necessary nor proper to deal
with them as illegitimate offspring of contract law. They may
be roughly classified for our purpose as positive and negative, the
former having to do with additional safeguards and remedies not
ordinarily provided by the law and the latter with attempts to.
limit or change the ordinary application of tlhe law to cases of the
kind in question.
I. SELF-HBLP BY CONTRACT.
In the discussions of self-help as distinguished from judicial
help in the enforcement of our rights, it is customary to point out
how in modern society the self-help that was common in early
days has practically disappeared. Blackstone is quoted to the
effect that in his day self-defense, reeaption or reprisal, re-entry
on land, abatement of nuisance and distress for rent were the only
instances left in which one could take the law into his own hands.'
It is generally added that most of these examples have disap-
peared in most jurisdictions since his day. But these discus-
sions overlook the growth of contractual self-help. Lien
law, for example, which in Blackstone's day was simply a branch
of procedure applicable in certain cases, has since been taken
over into the law of contracts so that the self-help of holding or
even of disposing of another's goods may easily be provided for
in many contracts. There is, of course, nothing new in contract-
ual attempts to provide a mode of enforcement where the ordinary
2 3 COMMENTARIES, pp. 3-16.
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provisions of the law of contract are inadequate. Dean Wigmore
has shown how the pledge idea antedates in most civilizations the
notion that it is a function of courts to collect ordinary debts.3 In
fact, the history of some branches of our law, notably mortgages,
is an account of the efforts of the courts to limit the effect of con-
tractual self-helf and bring it more or less within the bounds of
ordinary legal procedure. Yet new modes of self-help are con-
stantly being devised. To take a few instances from modern bus-
iness, there are the post-dated check, the conditional sale, the tak-
ing over of a voting interest in a business or the taking over by
a creditor of complete control of a business pending the payment
of its debt to him. In these cases, as in the case of a mortgage, as
abuses develop from the literal enforcement of the drastic terms,
the law attempts to tone down the self-help contractually provided
for. The most notable example in recent years is perhaps that of
the conditional sales agreement which no longer means what it
says in most states but is simply interpreted as if it were a sale of
goods with a mortgage back to the unpaid seller. It must not be
overlooked, however, that legislatures heve recognized the -pro-
priety of some varieties of contractual self-help and have even en-
couraged or extended them by statute. The Sales Act, for example,
gives the unpaid seller, in the absence of a contract to the con-
trary, several alternatives which he did not have at common law.
As summarized in Section 53, even after the property in the goods
has passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller has
"(a) A lien on the goods or right to retain them for the
price while he is in possession of them.
"(b) In case of the insolvency of the buyer, a right of
stopping the goods in transitu after he has parted with pos-
session of them.
"(c) A right of resale as limited by this Act.
"(d) A right to rescind the sale as limited by this Act.
Business men find it necessary to resort to contractual provis-
ions for self-help, particularly in cases where they deal with per-
sons without property. For this practical reason there has grown
up in some industries the practice of requiring a deposit from em-
ployees trusted with funds or valuable goods or, what amounts to
the same thing, a provision whereby the employer may retain for
stated periods a part of the employee's earnings.
It is even possible to give new life to a dying provision in the law
of seff-help by means of a contract. Thus it is not uncommon in
a "The Pledge Idea," 10 HAnv. ]. REv. 341; 11 Ibid. 18.
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leases to provide not only that the landlord shall have a lien on
the tenant's goods brought on the premises, but that in case of
their having been removed, the landlord may follow the goods and
distrain and take possession of them as if the goods had not been
removed.
It is thus extremely difficult to predicate any limits as to the
possibility of private arrangements between parties for the purpose
of facilitating or safeguarding transactions except in those few
cases in which the law has stepped in to prevent too drastic an ap-
plication of the principle of contractual self-help.'
II. THE MODIFICATION OF ORDINARY PROCEDURE.
A. Resisting Ordinary Provisions.
The idea of resisting the ordinary provisions of the law for the
enforcement of contracts strikes us today at first glance as an im-
pertinence, to say the least. It seems almost axiomatic that pro-
pedure is a matter for the courts. The elementary treatises tell
us unqualifiedly that "all agreements for pecuniary consideration
to control the regular adminstration of justice are void as against
public policy without reference to the question Whether improper
means are contemplated or used in their execution. Such agree-
ments are evil in their tendency and therefore it is the policy of
the law to discourage them by consistently holding them void.'"s It
is well to remember, however, that Anglo-American law has
achieved this position only through a long and peculiar history.
-In the Roman system a contractual theory of procedure seems to be
assumed: that is to say, an actual or fictitious pact is entered into
at one stage of the case to the effect that the defendant will pay
the plaintiff a certain sum if such and such of the plaintiff's alle-
gations are found to to be true. This contractual theory prevails
even if the cause of action is a pure delict. In the Anglo-American
system, on the other hand, we have a delictual theory of procedure
even though the cause of action is in contract. This is true in
spite of the fact that there is a contractual phase in the joinder of
issues by which the matter in dispute is left to the court or to the
jury. The agreement here lhas reference to the mode of trial. It is
not the basis of the obligation to abide by the judgment. It is
4 Part III of SCHA U and IsAAcs, THE LAW ix BUSINESS PROBLEMS, dealing
with the enforcement of contracts, is divided into two parts: the first dealing with
the ordinary machinery provided by the law and the second with special contractual
modes of safeguarding and facilitating credit. Cases are there collected illustrating
the business practices referred to in the above paragraph.
5 Cf. article "Contracts" in 6 R. C. L. § 751.
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therefore not quite so appropriate to speak of our judgments as
quasi-contractual obligations as it is so to describe the judgments
under the Roman system; yet we have taken over this theory of
the obligation of a judgment somewhat mechanically from the
continent of Europe. The significance of our delictual mode of
procedure in this connection is that it leaves little room for a
contract as to purely precedural matters.
Nevertheless we do find it desirable at times to agree not to sue
in a particular case, or, if sued, not to plead a particular defense.8
A perfectly legitimate motive in this connection may be to pre-
vent a multiplicity of suits. In such a case the stipulation of the
contract may take the form of an agreement not to sue any one
but a specified person. Such agreements have in proper cases
been upheld.7  A more common attempt is to limit the area within
which a suit can be brought. This is more dangerous inasmuch
as it arouses the jealousy of the court as to its jurisdiction. Agree-
ments seeking wholly to deprive any sovereign of jurisdiction are
usually conceded to be void.8 Partial limitations, on the other
hand, have been upheld. In Massachusetts the case of MHittenthal
v. Mascagnie suggested for a while the possibility of a reasonable
limitation of the area within which a suit can be brought. But
this seems to have been shaken by the recent ease of Nassau River
Paper Jo. v. Hammermil Paper Co.2° in which it was held that a
stipulation in a contract between a domestic and a foreign cor-
poration that no action should be maintainable against the latter
except in certain courts of its own state was invalid. 1' The prin-
ciple of these cases may seem at first sight to render general arbi-
tration clauses ineffectual to oust the courts of jurisdiction. Yet
courts have not overlooked the advantage to society of upholding
arbitration agreements so far as possible. The chief means of dis-
tinguishing between such agreements and stipulations to oust the
court from its jurisdiction has been to interpret the agreements
as involving nothing but a condition precedent to the fixing of
the liability of the defendant. Of course where the arbitration
serves to define a duty rather than to determine the question of
8 Cf. the numerous cases collected In the notes to § 399 of the article "Contracts"
in CortuS Jups, Involving attempts in this direction many of which were, of course,
held contrary to public policy. Of course forbearance to sue after a controversy
has arisen is almost universally held not only legal but a good consideration for a
counter-promise.
7 Cf. Lawrence v. Schaefer, 20 N. Y. App. Div. 80 (1897); affirm'ed 42 N. Y.
Su?. 992.
Insurance Co. v. Morse. 20 Wall. 445 (U. S. 1874), holding void an agreement
not to remove a case to the Federal Courts.
9 103 Mass. 19, 66 N. E. 425 (1903).
10 223 Mass. 8, 111 N. E. 678 (1916).
1 Cf. Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 109 S. E. 362 (N. C. 1921).
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its infringement, the condition precedent can easily be enforced.
As a matter of fact, it is sometimes extremely difficult to determine
whether a particular arbitration agreement has reference to the
defining of a duty or to the ascertainment of a breach. For ex-
ample, in those cases in which an architect's certificate is required
as a condition precedent to the duty of a contracting party to ac-
cept a building, in substance the architect is clearly substituted
for a tribunal. 2 Yet these cases have not only been given full
force and effect, but in Pennsylvania where a statute was passed.
in 1907 requiring a court to ignore such an agreement, the sat-
ute was held unconstitutional.:3 It appears, then, that by means
of the condition precedent contracting parties may go a great way
towards the selection of tribunals other than the courts for the
adjustment of certain of their disputes. Whether an agreement
making one of the parties the sole judge of the cause of action
arising out of the contract can be so upheld is a more difficult
question.'4 In general, it is hardly to be expected that this phase
of contractual control over adjective law, namely the complete re-
sistance of the ordinary procedure of the courts, will be the most
fruitful.
We turn now to efforts merely to vary the ordinary procedure
or anticipate it without ousting the court of its jurisdiction over a
complete subject matter.
B. Varying Details of Adjective Law.
In the first place we must consider the possibility of waiver of
many of the provisions of adjective law, which aim primarily to
give each side a day in court and a fair hearing. Thus one may
waive details connected with the summons and the summons itself
in the absence of a statutory provision making it clear that the in-
terest of the state rather than that of the individual is the basis.
of the requirement of the particular detail of summons sought to
be waived. An agreement that substituted service shall take the
place of actual service is generally effective. 5  In like
manner waivers are effective in the case of many othe-
details provided by statute for the safeguarding of a litigant down
to. the waiver of exemptions, though states differ very radically,
2 Cf. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§ 794-798. See, A. C. Biirnbam, "Arbitration as
a Condition Precedent," 11 HARV. L. REV. 234.
13 P. L. 1907, p. 381, § 1. Held unconstitutional in Adinolfl, Appellant, v. Hazlett
242 Pa. 25, 88 At. 869. (1913).
14 Fidelity etc. Co. v. Elckboff, 63 Minn. 170, 65 N. W. 351 (1895); White V.
Middlesex R. Co., 135 Mass. 216 (1883).
2 Cf. Copin -. Adamson, 9 Excb. 345 (1874).
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1922], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol29/iss1/2
CONTRACTUAL CONTROL OVER ADJEGTIV LAW
in the comparative emphasis they place upon the social or purely
personal nature of the interest served by the various stipulations
sought to be waived. Where courts realize, for example, that
homestead exemptions are primarily calculated to serve the inter-
ests of the state and the family rather than that of the insolvent
debtor, they do all in their power to ward off interferences with
them through contractual waiver.10
A most effective weapon of enforcement in most jurisdictions
is the warrant or power of one of the contracting parties to ap-
pear on behalf of the other and confess judgment as provided in
the judgment note. The possibilities, however, of this weapon
are by no means limited to promissory notes. In Pennsylvania,
for example, the power of confessing judgment for rent due is very
common in leases. In addition it is sometimes provided that the
landlord may appear on behalf of the tenant and confess a judg-
ment in ejectment so that the very first intimation that comes ta
the tenant after his alleged breach of the terms of the lease is the
appearance of a sheriff ready to remove his goods forcibly from
the premises excepting, of course, such as the landlord may care
to levy upon for the payment of the rent due or to become due.
The attitude of the several states towards this type of warrant i&
by no means uniform. In some it is provided by statute that no
confession of judgment is effective unless the debtor appears in
person. In others not only is the presence of the debtor dispensed
with, but it is deemed a sufficient compliance with the terms of
the warrant if the creditor, without actually appearing in any
court on behalf of the debtor, merely files the necessary document
with the prothonotary or clerk of court. And after a judgment
is rendered on the basis of such a warrant or power of attorney, the
26 It is generally said that exemption laws are not a part of the contract but
a part of the remedy and therefore subject to the law of the forum. Chicago-
etc. t. Co. v. Sturm, 107 U. S. 710, 43 L. Ed. 1144 (1899). Outside of Pennsylvania
it is generally held that a debtor's waiver of his exemption right by stipulation ot
an executory contract is void. 25 C. J. 111. The opposite rule prevails, however,
in Pennsylvania. Beatty v. Rankin, 139 Pa. 358, 21 Atl. 74 (1890), and cases there-
cited. Thus a tenant may waive his right to exemption as against distress for rent
although the statute expressly provides for such an exemption. McKinney v. Reader,
6 Watts 34 (Pa. 1837).
As to right of privilege of trial by jury, that may, of course, be waived by a
stipulation between the parties, and little or no difficulty seems to be experienced
in enforcing a stipulation of this kind contained in the original contract. The
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 4 L. Ed. 559 (U. S. 1819). On the
waivers spoken of in this paragraph, perhaps the best collection of authorities
in existence is that in Chapter 23 of PAGE, CONTRACTS, 2d ed., entitled "Contracts-
Waiving Rights." Unfortunately there is very little guidance offered among the
conflicting decisions on practically every point, but this situation is almost inevit-
able in an encyclopedic work with reference to a branch of the law in which
the personal Interests of the parties are brought into such frequent clash with the.
interests of society in the various objects for which the rights sought to be-
waived were created. Differences in the statutes creating or declaring the several
rights are also a factor, making the formulation of principles difficult, if not
Impossible.
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opportunities that the debtor has of having the judgment set aside
or modified differ very materially. Without going into the tech-
nical learning of this subject, which in most cases is nothing more
than satutory construction, it is clear that so far as the power to
confess judgment is an institution recognized by our law, it is in
effect, though perhaps not in theory, a very drastic mode of con-
trolling procedure by contract.' 7
A more direct and, on the whole, a less successful form of at-
tempts to control adjective law is concerned with rules of evidence.
'Theoretically what is and what is not admissible evidence is a sim-
ple question for the court to determine.18 A provision in a lease,
for example, that it shall be inadmissible in evidence if presented
for certain tyes of cases is very properly held void.19 Likewise a
stipulation that a certain document such as a voucher shall be con-
clusive evidence of a debt or of the existence of any other fact is
void.20 . In a recent Iowa casethe provision in the by-laws and
certificate of membership in a beneficial association that "disap-
pearance or long continued absence of the member, unheard of,
shall not be regarded as evidence of death or any right to recover"
was held void.2' It is possible, however, to constitute a finding
of any kind as prima facie evidence. 22 It is also possible, indirectly
by a particular officer or a certificate or document to give over-
whelming effect to a particular document by means of a stipulation
that no condition, representation, or warranty shall be binding on
one of the contracting parties unless incorporated into that doc-
ument or, what amounts to the same thing, the stipulation that a
particular document shall be construed without reference to any
other papers as constituting the contract between the two parties. 3
Such a possibility is based on the very simple principle that the
"integration" of papers must depend upon the intent of the par-
ties2 4 and where such intent is clearly expressed, it will naturally
control the question whether this or that document should be usa-
"7 Perhaps no state goes further than Pennsylvania in recognizing and making
effective such powers of attorney. In other jurisdictions not only has a tenden-
cy been shown to construe them very strictly, but statutes have been passed
either doing away with their effectiveness entirely or limiting their use. Cf. 23
CyC. 699.
B Ferguson v. Rogers, 129 Ark. 197, 195 S. W. 22 (1917), but cf. Roeh v.
Business Men's Protective Ass'n., 164 Ia. 199, 145 N. W. 479 (1914); Lewis v.
Brotherhood Accident Co., 194 Mass. 1, 79 N. E. 802 (1907).
x N. Y. etc. Orphan House v. Hoyle, 79 N. Y. Misc. 301, 139 N. Y. Sup. 1098(1913).
Guaranty Co. of North America -v. Charles, 92 S. C. 282, 75 S. E. 387, (1912);
N. Y. Fidelty etc. Co. v. Crays, 76 Minn. 450, 79 N. W. 531 (1899) ; contra Fidelty
etc. Co. v. Baker, 136 Ark. 227, 206 S. W. 314 (1918).
2 Fleming v. Insurance Co. 180 N. W. 202 (Ia. 1920).
2 Cf. Fidelty etc. Co. v. Eickhoff, note 14 above.
2 White Sewing Machine Co. v. Miller, 66 Minn. 119, 120, 68 N. W. 851 (1896).
2' Cf. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 633.
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ble as evidence. In like manner it is possible to render a particular
proposition incontestable indirectly if not directly. One may
either estop himself by his writing or stipulate that a particular
proposition will not be contested except in a certain way or within
a certain time limit.25
On the question of the powers of parties to a contract to change
the lawful time within which an action may be brought, courts are
by no means in agreement. It would seem that a stipulation fall-
ing within the statutory period of limitations should, if reasonable,
be upheld.2" On the other hand, to lengthen the period by contract
might seem like trying to pick oneself up with his own boot-
-straps.2" Yet for the very purpose of lengthening the period one
may slap a seal on his otherwise perfect, simple contract and thus
effectually, though not in terms, contractually control even this
feature of adjective law.
As to what does or does not constitute a waiver of a condition in
a contract, it would seem again that the question is primarily one
of law for the courts. Yet leases constantly repeat such stipula-
tions as that a consent on the part of the landlord to assign or sub-
let the property once shall not operate as a waiver of the condition
against assigning or against subletting. So far as the question is
one of interpretation either of the original condition or of the terms
of the waiver, it is, of course, quite reasonable to give such effect
to explicit words explaining the relation between the condition and
any contemplated waiver in advance.28
Judicial review, on the whole, we have come to look upon as a
sort of super-constitutional right. We feel that a man is ,entitled
not only to one day in court but to two or possibly three. The
psychological explanation of this attitude is probably that where
review by higher tribunals is provided for it is a little clearer that
25 The clause now commonly inserted in insurance policies that after being
in force a specified time they shall not be disputed or shall be incontestable pre-
cludes any defense after the stipulated period on account of false statements whichhad been warranted to be true even though made fraudently. Of. the cases
collected in 25 Cyc. 873 and the recent case of Chinery v. Insurance Co., 182 N. Y.Sup. 555 (1920), pointing out the requirement that the time should not be un-reasonably short. Other recent cases in "which the validity of the clause isdiscussed and upheld are Ramsey v. Insurance Co., 297 Ill. 592, 131 N. E. 108(1921) and Insurance Co. v. Miller,,245 U. S. 96, 65 L. Ed. 155 (1920). InGolden Cross v. Overton, 203 Ala. 335, 83 So. 59 (1919), it is suggested thatthe incontestability clause must not be taken as an assurance against crime but
an assurance against the hazard of litigation.
2 Fullam v. New York Union Ins. Co., 7 Gray 61 (Mass. 1859) ; NorthwesternIns. Co. v. Phoenix oil etc. Co. 31 Pa. 448 (1858); contra French v. LafayetteIns. Co., 5 McLean 461 (U. S. 1853).
- Of., however, State Loan and Trust Co. v. Cochran, 130 Cal. 245, 62 Pa. 466,600 (1900); Parchen v. Chessman, 49 Mont. 326, 142 Pac. 631, 146 Pac. 469(1914) ; State Trust Co. v. Sheldon, 68 Vt. 239, 35 AtI. 177 (1896).
=8 A long line of cases interpreting the famous Dumpor's Case, 4 Coke Rep. 119-b(1603), seems eventually to lead to a theory of the intent of the parties as thebasis for deciding whether any particular case does or does not constitute a waiver
of any given covenant.
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one is subject not to the pronouncements of. men but to the pro-
nouncements of law speaking through a whole system of courts. Yet
it is quite possible by statute or otherwise to limit the right to judic-
ial review. It is also possible effectively to waive one's rights in
this connection or even to contract in advance that the decision of
-the trial court shall be binding on the parties.2" So long as access to
a court is not entirely cut off, the agreement is not obnoxious to
the doctrine that the courts must not be ousted from their juris-
diction.
The remedy in every case should follow, theoretically, from the
law of the case"0 and not from any stipulation of the parties of the
nature of a penalty. It is needless to discuss in this connection,
however, the utter impossibility of drawing a perfect distinction
between penalties and liquidated damages. Suffice it to say here
that stipulations as to damages furnish one of the commonest illus-
trations in actual life of the power of parties to a contract to an-
ticipate and in measure control adjective law. It has been held
proper, however, for one to agree for a consideration that either of
several remedies may be applied.$' The stipulation that no dam-
ages shall be awarded has been upheld.3 2 As to costs, considerable
latitude is allowed excepting where the matter is narrowly regu-
lated by statute.3 3  The Negotiable Instruments Law by stipulating
that an agreement as to costs shall not impair negotiability has
probably stimulated the practice of contracting with reference to
costs in advance.34 Beyond damages, at least so far as the reme-
dies sought are equitable, it is rather difficult for the parties effect-
ually to control the outcome of their cases for the simple reason
that so much lies in the discretion of the court. Yet they can do
a great deal towards making clear in their agreements that such
phrases as render proper specific performance or accounting are
present in or are of the essence of their agreement. Thus by adding
a negative clause to an agreement of employment to the effect that
2. Hostetter's Appeal, 92 Pa. 132 (1879) ; Hoste v. Dalton, 137 Mich. 532.
100 N. W. 750 (1904). cf. Stedeker v. Bernard, 93 N. Y. 589, 591 (1883).
80 Columbian Woodmen v. Payne, 88 So. 454 (Ala. 1920).
31 Proctor Troy Properties Co. v. Dugan Store, Inc., 191 App. Div. 685, 181
N. Y. Sup. 786 (1920). Yet in a recent case it has been held that an agreement
not to prevent an injunction suit as a part of a contract for personal services
does not preclude an action for breach of contract. Reisler v. Dempsey, 173 N. Y.
Sup. 212 (1918). An agreement to waive the right to proceed by attempt to enforce
alimony is illegal. Glickman v. Glickman, 194 App. Div. 100, 185 N. Y. Sup.
421 (1920).
= Cf. Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Krogman, 111 Ia. 503, 82 N. W. 938 (1900).
3 Cf., however, Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. V. Butler, 57 Neb. 198, 77
N. W. 667 (1898), in which the very unusual cost element of expenses incurred in
procuring and continuing abstract of title for the purposes of foreclosure suit
in a mortgage was held improper in a bond and mortgage.
,4 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 2. paragraph 5. For a variety of clauses
taking advantage of this provision, cf. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW,
3rd ed., pp. 10-15.
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the employee shall not work elsewhere, they strengthen their
chances of an injunction, though of course in the absence of any-
thing unique about the services of the employee in question, they
do not insure the application of such a remedy.
Various attempts have been made to control in advance in a
manner differing from that prescribed by statute the administra-
tion of various estates. Business contracts frequently stipulate
what shall happen in the case of bankruptcy. Paitnership agree-
ments show a wide latitude, especially in their death clauses, as to
the winding up of the partnership affairs. Occasionally an agree-
ment of all parties in interest with reference to the administration
of an estate is upheld provided it does not run counter to the ap-
propriate law of the state with reference to wills and the like.35
Finally, the attempt to modify procedure may extend even to
the point of an agreement not to bid at a judicial sale. Such an
agreement has been upheld where there was full knowledge and
consent on the part of all interested parties and no fraud on the
court. 8
SUMMARY.
All that has been undertaken here is an enumeration of types
of attempts by contracting parties to control details of adjective
law. Many of them have been upheld in spite of the sweeping
proposition so common in the textbooks and in the opinions of
courts to the effect that all such agreements are void. This de-
velopment has not been accomplished without a great deal of
persistence, especially on the part of business men, a persistence
that has led to experimentation with innumerable expedients among
which comparatively few have survived the onslaught of the courts.
To all of this we may react as Lord Holt did in another matter and
ask why merchants cannot be satisfied to proceed according to
law. 7 Or we may assume another point of view: that flexibility
in procedure is a matter of genuine importance at times in the
business world. Historically the expression secundum legem mer-
catoriam which was known in the law books as early as the Thir-
teenth Century meant originally "following a particular procedure
rather than according to a particular system of substantive law." 38
It was a procedure distinguished above all things by its speed and
certainty and the absence of technicality. When the great lawyers
I Cf., however, Cox . Grubb, 47 Kans. 435, 28 Pac. 157 (1891).
6 Maffet v. IJams, 103 Pa. 266 (1883).
3 In Clerke v. Martin, 2 Ld. Raym. 757 (1702) and Buller v. Cripps, 6 Mod.
29 (1704).Isaacs, "The Merchant and H13 Law," 23 JouR..POL. ECON. 530.
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of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries conquered the special
courts and took over as their booty all of the Law Merchant, they
rendered a great service to English law; but one of the prices paid
for this service was the subjection of all parties before the law to
a procedure that had never been framed for all their cases. A
struggle for emancipation from this procedure characterizes the
legal history of the last century. In this struggle, which is by
no means complete, contractual efforts have played a part. And
why not? After all, the distinction between adjective law and
substantive law presents no difference in kind. Both affect
human relations in exactly the same way. In fact they frequently
appear to be merely different ways of stating the same proposition
with reference to a legal relation when that relation is properly
analyzed. The interest of contracting parties in the question
what is likely to happen in court is by no means an intermeddling
in matters which do not concern them. Whatever the law may
think about it, an uncollectible judgment for damages is to the
business world not an adequate remedy. An indefinitely delayed
satisfaction may for all practical purposes be as bad as no satisfac-
tion at all. Furthermore, it is not merely the part of society which
extends credit that is interested in the improvement of enforce-
ment machinery. The seeker of credit is even more directly inter-
ested, for everything that tends to make enforcement difficult or
insecure intensifies the difficulty of obtaining credit and its cost
when obtained. Whatever purposes may be served by a standard-
ized system for the enforcement of contracts, there is still a place
for individual treatments of special needs and accordingly a gen-
nine call for the draftsman of contracts to understand just wherein
and how modus et conventio vincunt legem.
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